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Abstract 
Recent empirical work suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and 
national income (the environmental Kuznet’s curve). This work has typically ignored the fact 
that pollutants are dispersed to varying degrees. This study shows how varying levels of spatial 
pollution dispersion  (or “publicness”) can affect pollution-income relationships.  A public goods 
model captures the idea of the "global commons" with two pollutants.  The model suggests that 
no refutable hypotheses are possible without restrictions on income and substitution effects.  
With such restrictions, emission levels are lower for countries that have high pollution spillovers 
and larger proportions of pollution emitted within their borders.  The model motivates the use of 
a switching regression approach to estimate the relationship between pollution emissions and 
national income for a set of countries.  The empirical analysis incorporates two key pollution 
dispersion variables: transboundary pollution spillovers and the portion of pollution remaining in 
the country of origin.   The pollution dispersion variables have a detectable effect on national 
pollution emissions although not necessarily those that them model predicts.￿
Transboundary Pollution and the Kuznet's Curve in the Global Commons 
 
 
1.  Introduction and Overview 
  This article concerns three issues.  First, how do different types of pollution respond to 
changes in national income?  Second, how does the physical dispersion or “publicness” of 
different types of pollution affect abatement?  Third, how does this “publicness” affect the 
income-pollution response or environmental Kuznet’s curve? 
   The debate over the environmental Kuznets curve (see Arrow et. al. 1995, Ezzati et. 
al.1998 ,Stern et. al. 1996) involves the response to local and global environmental issues as a 
function of income (see Runge, 1994; Farber, 1997).  Recent empirical evidence suggests that 
nations intervene to correct environmental problems even as trade liberalization and economic 
growth proceed apace.  Correction of environmental problems is positively correlated with 
income at the higher end of the national income scale, suggesting that limiting growth and trade 
may actually retard environmental interventions (Werner, Copeland and Taylor, 1998).  
Grossman and Krueger (1995), Selden and Song (1994), Lucas (1996) and others show that for 
many types of pollution, emissions or ambient levels of pollution at first increase with income to 
a peak level and then decline as income continues to increase.  This is the “inverted U-shaped” or 
“environmental Kuznets Curve” describing the response of higher income countries to 
environmental externalities.  
While the environmental Kuznets curve generates some optimism for proponents of 
economic growth (see Beckerman, 1992), some pollutants increase through the entire range of 
national income.  For example, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and CFCs seem to fit this pattern ￿
(Selden and Song, 1993; Shafik, 1994; Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1992), although CFC 
consumption and emissions have declined since the signing of the Montreal Protocol.  Thus 
economic growth may be necessary, but not sufficient, for improvements in environmental 
quality. 
The environmental Kuznet’s curve has thus become a focus of research, controversy, and 
critical review in the literature (Stern et. al, 1996) and the subject of two recent editions of the 
journals Ecological Economics, and Environment and Development Economics. Criticism has 
focused on three main issues.  First, the environmental Kuznet’s curve (at least as it has been 
estimated so far) is a reduced form relationship that does not explain what leads to downturns in 
pollution output, especially the process of institutional reform that takes place as countries 
develop policies to reduce environmental pollution (Arrow et. al, 1995). This reinforces the point 
that reductions in environmental damage as countries increase per capita income do not happen 
automatically (Grossman and Krueger, 1994; Stern et. al, 1996). Second, environment impacts 
can feed back to lower economic performance, a factor not accounted for in virtually all studies 
(Arrow et. al, 1995; Ezzati et. al, 1998; Stern et. al, 1996; Rothman, 1998; de Bruyn et. al, 1998). 
This can be especially important in very low income countries (Barbier, 1994).  Third, 
environmental Kuznet’s curve studies have generally not accounted for the evolution of 
international economies and policies. The current extent of global environmental damage to the 
ozone layer and changes to the earth’s climate regime were created in national and international 
economies different from those of today (Ezzati et. al, 1998).  It is also unclear whether today’s 
developing countries will be able to replicate the experience of developed countries such as the 
United States and Japan which reduced pollution output, in part, by importing energy intensive 
goods (Stern, 1996; Herendeen, 1994). ￿
Recent work has remedied some of these problems. Panayotou (1997) incorporates 
institutional factors into an analysis of SO2 concentrations by including a policy variable that 
accounts for respect and enforcement of contracts in a country’s economy as a whole. Torras and 
Boyce (1998) incorporate income inequality, political rights and liberties and literacy.  However, 
neither attempts to account for the simultaneous determination of  these variables and national 
income – richer countries may simply have better institutions, political rights and liberties.  
Ezzati et. al (1998), built a simulation model with  environmental feedbacks while de Bruyn 
(1997) performed a  decomposition analysis of reductions in SO2 emission output ratios. 
However, this analysis still does not explain why structural or technological changes have 
occurred to reduce emissions.  
This paper seeks to explain observed differences in pollution income relationships different types 
of pollution emissions. For example, the difference between CO2 and SO2 emission-income 
relationships because people prefer to wait to reduce carbon dioxide emissions until the current 
scientific debate over global warming is resolved and more willing reduce SO2 because of its 
immediate health effects.  The cost and efficacy of pollution abatement technologies will also 
have an effect on where abatement efforts are concentrated (McConnell, 1997).    
The central contribution of the paper, however, is to explore another possible 
explanation: the degree of pollution dispersion or its “publicness".  Publicness in pollution 
occurs when local pollutants created within any one jurisdiction spill over to affect people in 
other jurisdictions.   The more dispersed pollutants become, the more widespread are these 
negative spillover effects.  The extra-jurisdictional impact of such pollutants makes the collective 
action problem of reducing them more difficult because it requires the cooperation of larger and 
more heterogeneous populations and multiple jurisdictions.  The central idea is that people tend ￿
to place less priority on reduction of widely dispersed pollution, relative to more localized 
pollution, because local problems such as solid waste or bacteria in drinking water supplies are 
less “public” than global pollutants such as greenhouse gases or ozone depleting chemicals (see 
also Arrow et. al, 1995; Seldon and Song, 1994; Shafik, 1994; de Bruyn, 1997; Cole et.al, 1997; 
Barbier, 1997).  The argument is in the tradition of Olson (1965), who noted the role of 
publicness in confounding collective action. 
Related to the tendency to abate locally first and globally second is that as incomes rise, 
pollution can more easily be shifted away from immediate surroundings.  Alexander (1993) 
captures the essence of the idea:  “Their constituents, in the words of two-time director of the 
Environmental Protection Agency William Ruckelshaus, ‘want their garbage to be picked up but 
they do not want it put down, at least not in their neighborhoods.”
1  For example, household 
waste was (and is) often dumped close to the household in low income settings.  As incomes rise 
garbage collection can be more readily financed, shifting what had been a problem of inner city 
streets to large dump sites, generally on the outskirts of cities, or into large water bodies which 
carry the waste away.  Such wastes may also be burned, converting them into airborne pollution, 
or transshipped to other sites or countries.  Similarly, air pollution has been shifted away from 
local settings by building taller smoke stacks (Wetstone and Rosencranz 1983, Selden and Song 
1994, Revesz 1997).    
This activity may create local public bads out of what were once private bads, and global 
public bads out of what were once local public bads, as localities free ride by unloading their 
pollution onto other jurisdicitions.  The "dispersion factor" is thus a function of both the pollutant 
1 By constituents Alexander means the people that sanitation engineers serve in dealing with solid waste 
problems in industrialized countries. ￿
itself and of population density and political boundaries, none of which have been accounted for 
in recent analysis of the environmental Kuznet's curve. 
First, a theoretical model is specified that extends earlier public goods models developed 
by Cornes and Sandler (1986) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1987), to a model with two 
public bads, multiple jurisdictions and varying levels of pollution dispersion.   Consumption of 
pollution within a jurisdiction is determined by emissions levels in each jurisdiction and by 
pollution dispersion coefficients defining how pollution is exchanged across jurisdictions.   
Comparative statics for the model suggest that with some restrictions, pollution output within a 
jurisdiction is lower when pollution is more localized and when pollution spillovers are high.  In 
addition, with these restrictions there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between pollution 
emissions and income.   
Pollution dispersion and population density also affect the income level at which the 
pollution emissions begin to decline.  Jurisdictions with higher population densities, larger 
proportions of pollution remaining within their borders, and larger amounts of deposition from 
other jurisdictions will tend to lower their emissions per capita at lower levels of income per 
capita.   
Second, an empirical model is presented which departs from previous empirical work by 
using a switching regression model rather than quadratic or cubic functions.  The switching 
model is more flexible, allowing variables other than income to explain changes in the 
pollution/income relationship in a way interpretable by our theoretical model.  The empirical 
model includes data on an – own deposition factor, which accounts for the portion of emissions 
that stay within the country of origin, as well as spillovers of pollutants originating from other 
countries. This is also a departure from previous claims that environmental Kuznet’s curves exist ￿
mainly for localized pollutants (Arrow et. al, 1995; Shafik, 1994; Seldon and Song, 1994; Cole 
et. al, 1997; Barbier, 1997), but which do not specifically incorporate data describing the spatial 
dispersion of pollution.  Incorporation of own deposition factor and spillovers allows us to test 
directly  the effects of pollution dispersion on emissions levels and to compare dispersion 
characteristics of different pollution types.  Results for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions, using more recent and more complete data than previous studies, support the Kuznet's 
relationship between emissions per capita and income per capita, but also offer a deeper 
explanation of why institutions may respond to the collective action problems of environmental 
management in differing ways.    
 
2.  Model 
This section extends the public goods models of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), 
and Cornes and Sandler (1986) to multiple jurisdictions with multiple pollutants.  The method of 
public goods provision (or in this case public bads abatement) is voluntary contribution. The 
model captures the collective action problem when pollution is dispersed in varying degrees over 
multiple jurisdictions.   This collective action problem has two levels: within and across 
jurisdictions.  These jurisdictions may be thought of as countries, and the transboundary spillover 
effects as the "global commons."   
Individual agents are the only actors.  Each agent is endowed with income which they 
may either consume or use to abate pollution.  Pollution arises from consumption.  Each 
jurisdiction produces multiple pollutants as a function of aggregate consumption and aggregate 
abatement.  Agents can abate pollution only in their own jurisdiction, thus depending on agents 
in other jurisdictions to abate pollution that may spill over into theirs.   Pollution types have ￿
different levels of spatial dispersion, so that spillover effects vary.  Because pollution emissions 
are dispersed both within and across jurisdictions, agents willing to abate pollution face possible 
free riding from agents both within their jurisdiction and from agents in other jurisdictions. 
Major comparative statics results for this model are stated in section 3 to motivate the 
empirical analysis.  The important comparative statics results relate to jurisdictional responses of 
emissions, consumption levels and abatement levels to changes in income, own deposition 
factor, emissions spillovers originating from other jurisdictions, and population. The own 
deposition factor is the proportion of emissions originating from a jurisdiction that are consumed 
by  individuals within that jurisdiction.  
There are  J  local jurisdictions indexed by  jJ ∈= 1,...,  J (nations, states, or 
municipalities). Each of these local jurisdictions contain I j individuals indexed by 
iI jj j ∈= 1,...,  I .  The economy has one private good, and bads or pollutants indexed by 
k ∈ 12 ,  .  Private consumption of the private good is denoted by c
ij .   The vector e
j ∈ℜ +
2  
represents the total emissions of pollutants emanating from jurisdiction  j. The vector  E
j ∈ℜ +
2  
represents consumption of the two pollutants by each individual in jurisdiction j.   Individuals 
have preferences defined over ℜ +
3  that are representable by a quasi-concave, twice continuously 
differentiable utility function u
ij:ℜ→ ℜ +
3 .   The utility function  ucE
ii j jj ,  does not depend on 
e
j  directly, is strictly increasing in c
ij , and strictly decreasing in the ijth individual’s pollution 
consumption  E
j . 
Each individual ij is endowed with a quantity ω
ij ∈ℜ +  of the private good, which we 









Individuals allocate their endowment to consumption c
ij and to abatement of the two public 
pollutants or bads qk
ij , k  = 1,2. Consumption and contributions to abatement must satisfy the 
constraint cqq
iii i jjj j ++≤ 12 ω .  The two pollutants are produced as a by-product of consumption 
but may be reduced by abatement.   These relationships are defined by: 
 























, and the functions hk:ℜ→ ℜ +
2  are continuous, increasing in C
j  
and decreasing in Qk
j .  The income parameter in (1) captures the idea of different technologies 
for different levels of income. For example, higher income countries may employ more efficient 
technologies, which produce less pollution for a given level of consumption.  We shall assume 
that hk  is twice continuously differentiable in consumption, abatement and in the income 
parameter. Hence, pollution of both types originating from jurisdiction  j is increased when 
consumption of commodities by residents of jurisdiction  j increases.   Pollution of type k may 
be decreased by directing resources Qk
j  to its abatement.  Hence, effort to reduce pollution of a 
particular type may take the form of direct physical reductions in pollution through abatement or 
by reducing consumption.  The set of feasible emissions and consumption possibilities are 
defined by: 
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 ￿
and the consumption C
j  frontier of this set is represented by the function  fe e
cjj j
12 ,, ω   which 
represents the maximum consumption that can be obtained given  ee
jj
12 ,   and ω
j  (see Figure 1). 
Pollution emissions e
j are distinguished from pollution consumption  E
j , because 
pollution emitted in any one jurisdiction j may spill over into other jurisdictions.   For all 
individuals i jj ∈ I , consumption of pollutants is given by:  
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where α k
jm ∈ 01 ,,    jm , ∈ J, and k=1,2 describes how much of a unit vector of pollution type k  
emitted in jurisdiction m is consumed by individuals in jurisdiction j. The amount of pollution 







j − =− α .  
While this framework allows a large number of situations to be modeled, in terms of non-
excludability and rivalness (see Sandler and Sargent 1995), we shall restrict the discussion to the 
case: 01 <≤
∈ ∑ α k
jm
m J
, and  α k
jm > 0 for all mj , ∈ J which implies that pollution type k  is  “rival” 
across jurisdictions and that pollution type k  is non-excludable across all individuals and 
jurisdictions.  
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 for all k = 12 , .  When qk
ij > 0 
then agent ij is a contributor to the abatement of pollution type  k .  If the equilibrium is an 
interior solution (i.e., qk
ij > 0 for k=1,2 ), the equilibrium first order conditions for this Nash 
equilibrium may be manipulated to obtain a tangency relationship between a given agent ij’s 
















































j  and uc
i j  are marginal utility of emissions and consumption respectively and h
kC j and 
h
kQ j  are marginal changes in emissions of type k  with respect to consumption and abatement 
activity. The left hand side of this equation is the marginal rate of substitution between pollution 
type k  and consumption of the private commodity.  The right hand side is the marginal rate of 




j  , adjusted by the fraction of pollution that individual ij receives from emissions 
generated in his own jurisdiction, α k
jj .   The equality achieved at this tangency point is the 
familiar condition, for a given jurisdiction that MRS=MRT. 
 ￿￿
3.  Comparative Statics Results 
The theoretical results presented in this section show that when pollution stays close to 
the point of origin, abatement effort will tend to be greater and hence pollution emissions lower 
than when pollution is dispersed more widely.  When pollution spillovers are increased pollution 
abatement is also increased.  Substitution effects, or changes in the willingness to substitute one 
pollutant for another, or substitute pollution for consumption, may undo both of these results.   
Hence, the need for the empirical analysis which follows.  
The first result concerns how pollution changes when income changes, which is the 
underlying Kuznet’s relationship.  For this result and all that follow, we assume that  individual 
utility functions u
ij  are strictly quasi-concave twice continuously differentiable and identical for 
each individual within a jurisdiction (uu
i j j = ).  We will also assume that each individual within 
a jurisdiction j has identical income or ωω
i j j = .  Finally, we will assume that increases in either 
pollutant will increase the rate at which individuals are willing to trade off consumption for 
decreases in pollution.  This means that consumer utility functions satisfy ∂∂ −> uu E Ec k k  0 
for  k = 12 , .   
 
Proposition 1.  Assume that  pollution reduction is a normal good (∂∂ −> uu c Ec k 38 0 for 
k = 12 , ) and  the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and emissions decreases 
with increases in income  fe
c
kω ≤ 0 38  for all  ee 12 ,, ω 16 and individuals within jurisdiction  j .  Then 
i) if all members of jurisdiction j are contributors to  reduction of both types of pollution 












2 0 <  and; ii) if no members of jurisdiction j are contributors 





j > 0 for k = 12 , . Proof: See Appendix A. 
 ￿￿
If pollution is a normal good, the more of the private good consumers have and/or the 
more pollution there is the more they want to reduce pollution.  Under these conditions we would 
expect that when income increases beyond some critical point individuals within jurisdictions 
would want to decrease the level of pollution.  While Proposition 1ii) suggests that at very low 
incomes no effort is expended on abatement and that increases in income will lead to increases in 
emissions, the effect of an increase in income at higher incomes where jurisdictions may be 
actively abating is more ambiguous.  Emission changes are complicated by the magnitude of 
changes in marginal rates of substitution between the two pollutants and the marginal rate of 
transformation between consumption and income  fe
c
kω  .  For example, we might hypothesize 
that emissions of pollution of type A will decrease when spillovers of pollution of type A 
originating from other jurisdictions increase.  However, when their is more than one pollutant, 
the increase in pollution type A may lead individuals to become more concerned about other 
pollutants, possibly because of some interaction effect, leading individuals to decrease emissions 
of the other pollutants instead of type A.   
A crucial assumption in proposition 1 is that the marginal rate of transformation between 
consumption and emissions decreases with an increase in income  fe
c
kω ≤ 0 38 , which means that as 
income increases the jurisdiction is more capable of reducing pollution given a unit reduction in 
consumption.  If this assumption is true then emissions will decrease for at least one of the 
pollutants, otherwise we could not say whether emissions increase or decrease with income. One 
interpretation is that richer countries use more efficient technologies.  However, even with this 
assumption the result implies that the normal good assumption for the environment is not 
sufficient to generate a downward sloping relationship between income and pollution for all 
emission types.  As income levels and pollution levels change, priorities for abatement may ￿￿
change, resulting in increases in some type(s) of pollution. However, the normal good 
assumption is sufficient, along with the technological assumption, to ensure that pollution will 
decrease for at least one pollutant.  
 
  
Proposition 2. If all members of a jurisdiction contribute to reduction of both types emissions 
(k = 12 ,) ,  then emissions for at least one type decrease when emissions spillovers or own 
deposition factor increases.  That is ∂∂ ρ e
jj
1 0 < or ∂∂ ρ e
jj
2 0 < for any parameter 
ρα α
j j jjj EE ∈
−−
121 2 ,, , >C . Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
When individuals within jurisdictions contribute to abatement of both types of pollution, 
an increase in the portion of pollution consumed in the jurisdiction of origin ( α 1
jj  or α 2
jj ) or in 
pollution spillovers ( E
j
1
−  or  E
j
2
− ) will increase abatement of either pollution type.  Another 
interpretation is that if there are two otherwise identical jurisdictions that differ in own 
deposition factor or emissions spillovers then emissions will be lower for at least one type of 
pollution in the jurisdiction with the larger own deposition factor or transboundary spillovers. It 
is possible for the cross effects to be negative (∂∂ α e
jj j
21 0 <  or ∂ eE
jj
21 0
− < ) and not the direct 
effects, because substitution and/or income effects, which reflect a strong tendency to change 
abatement priorities, may over-ride the direct effects.  














j − < 0, k = 12 , . Proof: See Appendix A. 
Separability removes the substitution effects from the utility function.  Without 
substitution effects, increased spillovers and pollution consumption leads to a decrease in 
emissions. Conversely, decreased spillovers from other jurisdictions lead to a decrease in ￿￿
emissions.  This is the expected free riding effect as individuals is to increase their own 
emissions when others decrease them.  
Propositions 1-3 show that with multiple pollutants, emissions change with change in 
income, spillovers, and own deposition factor.  If substitution and income effects are sufficiently 
large then jurisdictional responses to changes these important variables may not conform to our 
intuition.  However, if  substitution and income effects are small then the restrictions in 
proposition 3 are sufficient to show that emissions, consumption and abatement change in the 
expected direction.  
Another issue is what happens to emissions when population increases.  On the one hand, 
emissions will increase when an additional individual is added to the population. However, if 
pollution reduction is a normal good then the willingness to trade off consumption for decreases 
in pollution will increase.  While the end result is ambiguous under the most general 
assumptions, if substitution effects and income effects are removed from the utility function and 
the technology is linear, then jurisdictions with higher population, everything else equal, will 
have  higher pollution emissions, even in a country that is actively abating pollution  However, 
per capita consumption decreases under these assumptions, which means that total per capita 
resources allocated to abatement of both pollutants increases.  Hence emissions per capita will 
decrease for at least one pollutant. 
 
Proposition 4. Population Comparative Statics. Assume that the utility functions are additively 
separable, pollution reduction is a normal good, and that the emissions/consumption 





j =− β θ  for k=1,2.   Let ~ ek
j ,  ~ C
j,   ~ Qk
jrepresent jurisdictional 
responses under  ~ I
j  and ek
j , C
j , and Qk
j  represent equilibrium allocations under  I
j . Assume 
all other parameters, utility functions, and technologies are the same.   Let all individuals be 
contributors to abatement for per-capita income level ω
j . If 
~ II
jj >  then  ~ ee k
j
k
j > , 
~ CC
jj > and ￿￿
~~ QQQQ
jjjj
1212 +>+ .  In addition,  ~~ CI CI
jj j j < ,  ~~~ QQI
jjj
12 +> 49    QQI
jj j
12 + 49 and  
~ ~ eI eI k
jj
k
jj <  for k=1 or 2. Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Own deposition factor, spillovers and population levels may also effect the critical level 
of ω
j , where the emissions-income relationship turns from positive to negative.  Again, the 
effects of these factors are ambiguous unless strict assumptions are imposed. However, when the 
utility function is additively separable and the emissions technology is linear,  increased 
spillovers, own deposition factors and higher populations should decrease this critical level.  
 
Proposition 5. Assume that the utility functions are additively separable, pollution reduction is a 





j =− β θ  
for k=1,2. Suppose that  ￿ αα 11
jj jj > ,  ￿ EE
jj
11
−− >  and  ￿ II
jj > .  Let ω
j  be the critical income 
associated with  α 11
jj j j EI ,,
− 49  such that when ωω
jj < , e
j
1  is increasing in ω
j  and when ωω
jj ≥  
e
j
1  is decreasing in ω
j .  Let   ￿ ω
j  be the critical income level for  ￿ ,, α 11
jj j j EI
− 49 ,  α 11
jj j j EI , ￿ ,
− 49  or 
α 11
jj j j EI ,, ￿ − 49 . Assume that Q
j
2 0 = .  Then in each case  ￿ ωω
jj < . Proof: See Appendix A 
 
Proposition 5 suggests that the income level at which emissions are reduced, is likely to be 
affected by many factors.  This might indicate that empirical analysis could be improved by 
incorporating variables that shift the critical income level. 
The results presented in this section show that when pollution stays close to the point of 
origin, abatement effort will tend to be greater and hence pollution emissions lower than when 
pollution is dispersed more widely.  When pollution spillovers are increased pollution abatement 
is also increased.  Substitution effects, or changes in the willingness to substitute one pollutant 
for another, or substitute pollution for consumption may undo these results.   Hence, the need for 
the empirical analysis which follows. 
 ￿￿
4.  Empirical Model 
This section investigates two pollution-income relationships: sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides.  Nitrogen oxides tend to be more dispersed than sulfur dioxides. The first objective is to 
estimate an empirical relationship between pollutant emissions and income using a switching 
regression model to test the theory and to compare it with previous empirical results.  The second 
objective is to extend the empirical model to include the spatial aspects of transboundary 
pollution spillovers and the fraction of pollution (own deposition factor) remaining in the country 
of origin
2. Results are then compared to the comparative statics above. Sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides were chosen because they offer the largest possible emissions databases and 
because they are the only two pollutants for which transbounary data is available.  The 
transboundary movement of these pollutants is also uneven due to wind, degree of mixing with 
higher atmospheric layers and rainfall, creating enough variation in deposition rates and own 
deposition to test our theory.  Previous analysis of pollution - income interactions has relied 
mainly on quadratic or cubic equations (Grossman and Krueger 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; 
and Shafik 1994, Cole et. al. 1997, Panayotou 1997).  The analysis here is instead a deterministic 
switching regression approach suggested by Goldfeld and Quant (1971). The switching approach 
is useful because it is reminiscent of the theoretical model presented in the previous section.   
Two regimes, representing a "high" and the other a "low" level of pollution abatement, are 
posited:  
2 This aspect of our analysis, is similar to that of Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent (1997) who estimate 
models of voluntary cutbacks of SO2 and NOx in Europe. However, our data is composed of a panel set of 
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β β ω β β
β β ω β β α β
α
β
ο 12 3 0 1
56 7 8 9 1 0 0 2
regime1
regime2 ,
         (10) 
where ek
jt  is nation  j’s emissions of sulfur dioxides (ks = ) or nitrogen oxides (kn = ), ω
jt  is 
GDP per capita,  I
jt  is population, α
jjt  is country  j’s own deposition, α k
jt  is a vector of 
emissions transport coefficients, and ek
jt −  is a vector of “other country” emissions,  t  is the time 
period,  X
jt




2 are error 






jt −− =α , which we divide by A 
j to provide a proxy for dispersion of pollution spillovers 
within country j.  The model is reminiscent of the public bads model in the previous section in 
the sense that regime 1 represents the corner solution where no resources are expended to control 
pollution.  Regime 2 can be thought of as the case where contributions are made to abate the 
pollutants.   















22 2 =+ γ ε . 
The error components γ k
j
1 and γ k
j
2  account for differences in individual country behavior, but 
which can vary across the two regimes.  The error components ε k
jt
1 and ε k
jt
2 are within country 
errors that may also have different variances across the two regimes.  
The model orders the data according to income, splitting it at some low level of ω
jt . 
Parameter estimates are then estimated for the two sets of data.  The database is then split again ￿￿
at the next highest level of income and the parameters are estimated again.  This is done until the 
highest level of income is reached.  The switching point is the level of income ω
* that yields the 
highest value for the joint likelihood function (i.e. the sum of the likelihoods for the two 
equations estimated for each division of the database).  This is the procedure suggested in Judge 
et. al. (1985) and used by Stratmann (1992) in an empirical study.   
Comparative statics suggest that the portion of emissions remaining in the country of 
origin, the level of spillovers or other factors might influence when to begin abatement.  Because 
splitting the database raises combinatorial problems, we employ the method of Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1973) using maximum likelihood techniques, and define a step function  gx kk
jt θ38  where 
gx k k
jt θ49 = 1 when θ k k
jt x > 0 and  gx kk
jt θ38 = 0 when θ kk
jt x ≤ 0.   Thusxk
jt  will include a constant 1, 
income per capita ω
jt , population density, own deposition factor, pollution spillovers originating 
from other countries, and other covariates.   The symbol θ k  is an unknown parameter vector, 
including a constant. Equation (10) can then be written as one equation.
3  
 
3 The equation is written somewhat differently here than in (10), because β ο k , β k1, β k2  and β k4  are 
chosen for both regimes in (11).  The coefficients β k5 toβ k7  and β k10in (10) can be recovered from (11) 
as follows, β β β ο kk k 55 =+
~
, β β β kk k 61 6 =+
~
, β β β kkk 72 7 =+
~
, and β β β kk k 10 3 10 =+
~
.  Note, that the 
error term uk
jt  accounts for heteroskedasticity across the two regimes.  To avoid the combinatorial 
problem the function  g must be continuous and have a range between 0 and 1.  Goldfeld and Quant 
(1973) suggest that any S-shaped function that is close to 0 when θ k k
jt x  is very negative and close to 1 
when θ k k
jt x is very positive should work well - such as the cumulative normal distribution or logistic 
functions. The empirical analysis presented in this chapter was done with the logistic function:  












With this approach the level of differentiation between regimes can be strong or weak, depending on 
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  (11) 
To identify a specific parameter that may be interpreted as the degree of differentiation 
between regimes consider the constant term (θ 1k ) in the switching equation 
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Let −= − θ ρ k 100 16  and θ ρ θ nk nk =
~  for n=1,…,6.  Then 
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where U can be interpreted as the degree of discrimination between regime 1 and 2.  The degree 
of discrimination reflects uncertainty in our ability to distinguish whether a data point belongs to 
regime one or two.  Another way of interpreting the model is to assume that there is a 
“continuous mixture of regimes”. The parameter U can also be interpreted as the “fuzziness” 
exhibited by nature in generating the data (Goldfeld and Quandt 1972). Estimates of our model 
for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides were also carried out jointly, with contemporaneous 
correlation between random effects and errors to increase the efficiency of the estimation of the 
parameters
4. 
4 To account for differences in variances of error terms in the two regimes, the term uk
jt  can be written:  
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The data is a panel set which includes observations for 48 countries for years1970, 1975, 
and 1980 to 1993 for a total of 733 observations (see Appendix on data sources).   
5.  Empirical Results 
In this section we present results for two jointly estimated sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
models, reported in tables 1 and 2 respectively.  Both models include GDP/capita, and 
population density variables, pollution dispersion variables, and regional dummy variables.  The 
purpose of the empirical analysis is to determine whether: i) pollution dispersion variables affect 
pollution-GDP relationships, ii) our data supports the restricted theoretical model comparative 
statics results , and (iii) whether the more widely dispersed pollutant (in this case NOx) switches 
to a more interventionist regime 2 at a higher level of income.  We take nitrogen oxides to be the 
more widely dispersed pollution because each country, its own deposition factor for NOx is less 
than that for SO2.  The average difference between deposition factors for SO2 and NOx  is 6.12%.  
Model 2 adds a restriction to the model that requires the switching points for sulfur dioxide be 
greater than or equal to that of nitrogen oxides.   This provides a test for the hypothesis that the 
We also recognize that there may be differences in the variance of γ k
j across the two regimes. However, 
the some countries will have some observations in regime 1 and other observations in regime 2.  Hence, 
we will let  γ k
j
1 be the within country error component for pure regime 1 countries and γ k
j
2 be the within 
country error component for pure regime 2 countries. For countries with observations in both regimes γ k
j  
is defined: 
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switch point for the more widely dispersed pollution, nitrogen oxides, occurs at a higher level of 
income.    
The switching parameters for both the sulfur and nitrogen models are highly significant.  
However, the signs of the parameters for own deposition factor, the spill-over variable, and 
population density do not correspond to that predicted by the restricted theoretical model 
described in section 3 (i.e., the model that restricts substitution and income effects).  The GDP 
per capita variable is positive indicating that countries with larger GDP/capita are more likely to 
be in regime 2.   The negative coefficients for population density, own deposition factor and the 
spill-over variable indicates that the larger these variables are, the more likely the country is 
identified as a regime 1 country.  The result for own deposition factor may be driven partially by 
the United States and Canada, which have large own deposition factors and whose emissions are 
high relative to other developed countries.   
In the nitrogen models the switching parameters for income is significant and of the 
expected sign.  Unlike the sulfur model, the coefficients on own deposition factor are of the 
expected sign and  significant.   The regime 1 to regime 2 switch points for sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide, when all other variables are held at their means, are $11,089 and $12,010 
respectively
5.  Ninety-five percent  confidence intervals for these switch points are [$10,827, 
$11,351] for sulfur and [$11,748, $12,272] for nitrogen.   Inclusion of the constraint requiring 
the sulfur dioxide switch point be greater than or equal to that of nitrogen oxides indicates that 
there is a significant difference between these two income levels (see chi-square test in table 1).  
which is a weighted average of the regime 1 and 2 errors with the weights defined as the switching 
function values for each observation within the country.  Hence, in estimating our model the variance-
covariance matrix accounts for within and between country error components and heteroskedasticity 
across both components. 
5 Switch points are defined where equation 12 equals 0.5 and equation 13 equals 0.  ￿￿
This result corresponds to what we would expect for more widely dispersed pollutants – 
abatement should begin at higher incomes.    
The parameter estimates for regime 1 income variables are positive and significant at the 
p-value level of 0.01.  Population density estimates are not significantly different from zero for 
both pollutants. The regime 2 parameter for the constant term is positive for both pollutants as 
expected.  For the GDP per capita variable, the parameter estimates are significantly negative for 
both sulfur and nitrogen dioxide.  For sulfur dioxide, the sum of this parameter (-1.1286) and the 
regime 1 parameter (0.7399) is negative (-0.3887) and significantly different from zero at the p-
level of 0.01. For nitrogen, the sum of these two variables is positive (0.0685) and significantly 
different from zero at the p-value of .05.  However, the slope is significantly lower than the 
regime 1 slope.  The positive slope for nitrogen oxides also supports the notion that widely 
dispersed pollutants receive less abatement attention than less dispersed or more local pollutants. 
However, it may also indicate higher costs and lower preferences for abatement.  
The sign of the population density parameter for regime 2 is positive for the sulfur 
dioxide model and negative for the nitrogen oxide model.  Hence, increased population density 
tends to be associated with higher sulfur dioxide emissions per capita and lower nitrogen oxide 
emissions per capita. The restricted model predicts lower emissions per capita.  Hence, for 
population density, only the nitrogen results conform to the restricted theoretical model.   
The regime two coefficients for own deposition factor and spillovers are negative and 
significantly different from zero in both models.  Hence, countries whose emissions tend to be 
retained within their borders tend to have lower emissions. In addition, countries with larger 
transboundary spillovers tend to have lower emissions.   This conforms to what the restricted 
theoretical model predicts. These estimates are not just statistically significant but are also ￿￿
significant in terms of effect sizes expressed in terms of elasticities.  Elasticity estimates for own 
deposition factor are –0.85 for sulfur dioxide and –0.49 for nitrogen oxides (see Table 3). This 
means that countries with own deposition factors 1% higher will have lower emissions by factors 
of –0.84% and –0.49% respectively.  For spillovers, the elasticity estimates are smaller but still 
significant at  –0.19 and –0.17 for sulfur and nitrogen respectively.  
Elasticity estimates are less convincing for population density with absolute values of 
estimates less than 0.05 even for statistically significant parameters, in all cases except for 
nitrogen oxides in regime 2.  However, the elasticity estimate for population density in regime 
two was still rather low in absolute value at –0.09.  Elasticity estimates for switching point shifts 
are also quite low, even for statistically significant parameters. Only the estimates for own 
deposition factors were greater in magnitude than 0.1. Hence,  population density and spillovers, 
although they may be significant in a statistical sense, do not seem to significantly affect 
switches to a pollution abatement regime in a practical sense.  
The coefficient for the time trend was negative and significant in the case of sulfur 
dioxide and positive but not significant for nitrogen oxide.  This indicates that the trend for sulfur 
dioxide emissions per capita is decreasing over time.  The dummy variables for Eastern Europe 
are large, positive and significant for both nitrogen and sulfur dioxide – as we would expect for 
the former Soviet Bloc countries.  The dummy variable for North America is also large.  This is 
probably reflective of the large metal smelting industries in both of these countries.  ￿￿
Table 1.  Switching model results for emissions per capita as dependent variable.                 
Parameter estimates are for sulfur dioxide.   
    Model 1  Model 2 
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*Indicates the parameter is significant at a p-value of 0.1.  **  Significant at a p-value of 0.05.                                
*** Significant at a p-value of 0.01. All single parameter tests are two-tailed. 
Models 1 and 2 were estimated jointly with the nitrogen oxide model with contemporaneous correlation 
between random effects and errors. 
 ￿￿
Table 2.  Switching model results for emissions per capita as dependent variable.                
Parameter estimates are for nitrogen oxides   
    Model 1  Model 2 


















































































*Indicates the parameter is significant at a p-value of 0.1.  **  Significant at a p-value of 0.05.                       
*** Significant at a p-value of 0.01. 
Models 1 and 2 were estimated jointly with the sulfur model with contemporaneous correlation between 
random effects and errors.  ￿￿










Model  Emissions   Variable  Emissions  Variable 
Income Regime 1  0.65  0.63  5.17  4.58  2.20  5.49 
Income Regime 2  -1.18  0.19  4.45  13.52  5.10  14.09 
Population Density Regime 1  -0.02  0.001  5.17  34.13  2.20  38.46 
Population Density Regime 2  0.015  -0.09  4.45  42.24  5.10  11.21 
Own Deposition Factor  -0.85  -0.49  4.45  19.81  5.10  16.67 
Spillovers  -0.19 -0.17 4.45  20.09  5.10  11.04 

















Population  Density  0.012 0.008 11.09  35.48  12.01  13.48 
Own Deposition Factor  0.14  -0.11  11.09  19.60  12.01  13.49 
Spillovers 0.024  -0.003  11.09  18.71  12.01  10.23 
Elasticities are in terms of %’emissions per capita over %’ in variable.  
*** Indicates statistical significance of the variable in the model at the p-value 0.01. (see tables 1 and 2). 
Units: emissions in Mt/100 people, income in $1000/person, population density in persons/10ha, own 
deposition factor in %, pollution deposition in t/1000 ha.￿￿
 6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
We conclude by addressing the issues raised at the outset: (1) Do different pollution types 
manifest different responses to changes in national income?  (2) How does the publicness of 
different pollution types affect willingness of jurisdictions to abate them?    (3) How does 
publicness relate to the income-pollution response or environmental Kuznet’s curve?   The 
theoretical results suggest that publicness should affect how jurisdictions abate pollution.  The 
empirical results broadly support this. They also support the theoretical model results presented 
in section three with some qualifications.  The estimated empirical relationship supports a 
Kuznets relationship between income and pollution for sulfur dioxide, showing that emissions 
per capita tends to increase towards a critical point and then to decline.  However, for nitrogen 
oxides there is still an positive relationship between emissions per capita and income in regime 
two, although significantly less than in regime one.  Hence, pollution types with different 
dispersion patterns or levels of publicness have different emission-income relationships.    
The results also support the hypothesis that more widely dispersed pollution tends to be 
abated less than more local pollution.  This is shown in two ways.  First, the switching point for 
nitrogen oxides – the more widely dispersed pollutant – occurs at a higher level of income than 
that for sulfur dioxide (see chi-square test in tables 1 and 2). Of course, other factors could be at 
work.  For example, Sandler and Sargent (1996) suggest that NOx emissions have not been cut 
back to the same extent as SO2 emissions in Europe because the NOx emissions are due to a large 
number of small polluters.  In 1990, 60.4% of SO2 emissions in OECD countries came from 
power plants, 35.4% from other stationary sources and only 4.2% came from mobile sources.  
However, only 25% of NOx emissions came from power plants, 22% came from other large ￿￿
stationary sources and 53% came from mobile sources in the transport sector.
6  It thus appears 
that free riding occurs both within countries and across countries for NOx but only across 
countries for SO2.  Hence, free riding takes place at different levels of jurisdiction and to varying 
degrees at these different levels as hypothesized. Second, countries with higher own deposition 
factors for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides tended to have lower emissions.  The one 
qualification is that countries with higher own deposition factors and spillovers of sulfur dioxide 
tended to extend the switch point (at which emissions begin to decline with income) to higher 
levels of income.  
Our results also relate to the debate over economic growth, trade and the environment. In 
response to criticisms of trade - led growth, which was thought to create worsening 
environmental conditions, empirical analyses showed that in general, “richer is cleaner,” thus 
supporting more liberalized trade.   The empirical evidence presented here lends some credence 
to this view.  However it also yields a caution.  First, most of the countries of the world are still 
on the upward sloping portion of the emissions income curve analyses (Selden and Song 1994). 
Second, even after emissions decline in the richest countries, they remain the highest emitters per 
capita in the world.  Even if emissions in the richest countries continue to show a downward 
trend, the developing countries have higher population densities which tend to delay abatement 
and increase emissions per capita, at least in the case of sulfur dioxide.  
Finally, these results highlight the difficulties in crafting effective international 
agreements for transboundary environmental problems if nations tend to place higher priority on 
local environmental problems than on global ones.  This basic incentive structure may lead to a 
differential impact on the innovation of rules or mechanisms that place constraints on the 
6 Source: OECD 1995 Environmental Data Compendium and author’s own calculations. ￿￿
behavior of agents for pollution control both within and across nations.  The number and 
heterogeneity of agents across multiple jurisdictions will make the collective action problem of 
constructing rules, penalties and enforcement schemes more difficult for the most widely 
dispersed pollutants, leading to a bias toward stricter rules for less widely dispersed pollution 
occurring mainly at local levels of jurisdiction.  Too much emphasis on local and insufficient 
emphasis on global environmental problems, raises the stakes for those seeking institutional 
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Appendix A: Theory 
Proof of Propositions 1-3. 
First, note that the individual agent utility maximization problem (4)-(7) may be re-written 
in the following form: 
  max , ,
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i j ii j j ii j j i
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ij is strictly increasing in c , constraint (A4) will be satisfied with equality.   Therefore (A4) may 
be dropped and (A2),(A3) and (A5) replaced with: 
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We want to derive comparative statics results for each jurisdiction j.  To simplify the analysis we 
will assume that each individual ij  within a jurisdiction j is identical both in preferences uu
ij = , 
income  ωω
i j j =  and  dispersion coefficients for each pollutant, αα k
ij
k
oj j = and  EE k
i
k
j j − − = .  We 
will also assume that there is a single, stable symmetric equilibrium within a jurisdiction.   Let 
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where c
j − corresponds c
ij −  and ρ ωα α
jj j oj oj j j j IE E c =
−− − ,, , , , , 121 2 >C .  If constraint (A3) or (A3’) is 
binding then the agent is consuming all of his endowment and thus contributing nothing to the 
abatement of pollution.  If (A5) or (A5’) is satisfied with equality for k = 1 or k = 2  then the 
individual is not contributing to abatement of pollution types 1 or 2 respectively.  If an individual 
is contributing to abatement then constraints (A2’),(A3’), and (A5’) are non-binding constraints 
and we have an interior solution. Assuming that all individuals are contributing to abatement of 
both types of pollution, the first order conditions for the individual’s problem are: 
  Vu fu ce
c oj
11 1 1 0 =+= α  (A6) 
  Vu f u ce
c oj =+=
2 21 0 α  (A7) 
where we use the notation uu c c =∂ ∂ , uu e k k =∂ ∂ , and ff e e
cc
k k =∂ ∂ . Denote the Hessian for this 
problem  DV e e
j 2
12 ,, ρ   which is negative semi-definite. 
 
Suppressing the  superscripts, let  
φρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ 16 16 16 27 16 16 49 = Vf e e Ie e c
12 12 ,, , ,  ￿￿
 and  Ue e Ve e 12 12 ,, ,, ρ ρ φ ρ 16 16 1 6 =−   
where U is the primal-dual objective function. In an equilibrium, all individuals are maximizing 
utility given every other individuals choices of consumption and emissions levels.  Since,  for any 
given U,  I(U) represents the maximum utility attainable then U(e1,e2, U) has a maximum of 0 at 
(e1(U),e2(U)).  Differentiating U(e1,e2, U) with respect to (e1,e2) yields the  first order conditions 
(A6) and (A7).  Differentiating with respect to ρ κ , where ρ κ  is one of 
ceeEE
i i i i iiii j j j j jjjj −−− − − ,,, , ,, , 12 1 2 1 2 ωαα 49 , yields the envelope result:  
  UV ρ ρ ρ κκκ φ =−=0 (A8) 









=+ .   Second order sufficient conditions for a 
maximum of the primal-dual objective function,  with choice variables  ee 12 ,, ρ κ 16 ,  require that the 
matrix: 
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be negative definite.  The second derivative  Vρ ρ κκ  is  






ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ κκ κ κ κ κκ κκ =+ ++ 38 3 8
2
2 .  
Differentiating the first order condition (A8) with respect to ρ κ  with e1 ρ16  and e2 ρ16  substituted 
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This equation can be rearranged to yield: 
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where the inequality follows from the fact that  DU
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   (A11) 
Proof of Proposition 1 
For proposition 1i), ρ ω k
j = , uω = 0.  Hence, the last two terms in the square brackets of (A11) 
are zero in this case.  Since we assumed ∂∂ − uu c Ec k 38 >0, and  f e
c
k ω ≤ 0 for k = 12 ,  and since ￿￿
f
c
ω > 0 the terms in the brackets are negative.  Hence the whole expression is positive unless at 
least one of  ∂∂ ω e
j
1  and ∂∂ ω e
j
2 are less than zero (i.e. ∂∂ ω e
j
1 0 < or ∂∂ ω e
j
2 0 < ).  This 
concludes the proof of proposition 1i).  For part ii), there are no contributors to abatement by 
assumption. Hence, c
i j j = ω , and qk
ij = 0 for k = 12 ,   for all individuals.  Clearly an increase in 
ω
j  will increase consumption for all individuals and hence overall consumption C
j.  Since, 







jj ≥= ,, , , ωω    0  and hCQ k
j
k
jj ,, ω   is increasing in C
j the conclusion follows. 
This concludes the proof of proposition 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 For ρ α κ = m
jj , ∂α f
c
m
jj = 0, m= 12 , .  Therefore the first two terms in the square brackets 
of (A11) are zero.  In addition, uu e
kk Ek α =  and therefore  
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0 where the 
inequality is strict if km = .  Therefore, both of the terms in the square brackets of (A11) are 
positive.  Hence, ∂∂ α e k
jj
1 0 < or ∂∂ α e k
jj
2 0 <  for k = 12 , .   For ρ κ =
− Em
j , ∂ fE cm
j − = 0, m= 12 , .  





− =  and 
therefore  





































for  k = 12 ,  and m= 12 , . Hence, ∂∂ eE k
j
1 0
− < or ∂∂ eE k
j
2 0
− < .  This concludes the proof of 
proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
For proposition 4, first consider ρ α κ = m










0 by additive separability,  mk ≠  
the expressions (A12)  and (A13) are zero for mk ≠ .   Since the expressions (A12) and (A13) are 
positive for mk =  then it is clear from (A11) that ∂∂ α ekk
jj < 0 and  ∂∂ eE kk
j − < 0f or k = 12 , .  
 
Proof Sketch of Proposition 4.  Comparatives statics on population.   
To prove that ~ ee k
j
k
j > ,  ~
CC
jj > and  ~ QQ k
j
k
j >  if  ~
II
jj >   k = 12 , note that for I
j or  ~
I
j ,  the 
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 (see equation 8) are assumed to be 







j k κ  because of the assumption of linear 
technologies.  By  the assumption that pollution is a normal good, if cc
jj > ~  then  EE k
j
k
j < ~ . To 
prove ~ ee k
j
k
j >  suppose, without loss of generality, that ~ ee
jj
11 ≤ .  Then by the pollution 















− α it is clear that  ~ EE
jj
11 ≤  since by 
assumption every parameter is unchanged except  I
j.   Hence, for the above equilibrium condition 
to hold ~ cc
jj ≥  which implies  ~~ qqqq
jjjj
1212 +≤+   by the budget constraint for each individual.   
This also implies that  ~ EE
jj
22 ≤  by the equilibrium condition and the conditions on the utility 
function.   Since  ~ ~~ qQ I k
j
k




















































￿￿ = β θ β θ  
 for at least one k = 12 , .   Then  ~ EE k
j
k
j > , which is a contradiction.   
Hence ~ ee k
j
k
j >  and  ~ EE k
j
k
j >  for  , k = 12 , which by the equilibrium condition means that 
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j  for at least one k = 12 , .   
 
Proof of Proposition 5.   
To prove proposition 6 assume that  ￿ ωω
jj ≥ .  Suppose  ~ ω
j  is such that  ￿ ~ ωωω
jjj ≥≥  and 
let 
~ , ~ , ~ ,~ CQEe
jjj j 38  be the equilibrium allocation for  ~ ω
j  when the parameter vector is 
α 11
jj j j EI ,,
− 49  and let  ￿ , ￿ , ￿ , ￿ CQEe
jjj j 38  be the equilibrium allocation for  ￿ ω
j  when  ￿ ,, α 11
jj j j EI
− 49 , 
α 11
jj j j EI , ￿ ,
− 49  or  α 11
jj j j EI ,, ￿ − 49 .   At  α 11
jj j j EI ,,
− 49   and  ~ ω
j  the equilibrium allocation 
~ , ~ , ~ ,~ CQEe
jjj j 38  satisfies: 











u 16    (A14) 
with  ~ Q
j
1 0 ≥  and  ~ q
ij
1 0 ≥  for each individual in the jurisdiction.  The equation (A14) is an the 
equilibrium condition which can be derived by rearranging the first order condition for q
ij
1  for 
problem (4)-(7) in the text .  The equilibrium condition is satisfied with equality because for  
α 11
jj j j EI ,,
− 49   the wealth level ω
j  is the critical one and since  ~ ωω
jj ≥  the equilibrium allocation ￿￿
for  ~ ω





11 = ∑  is increasing in ω
j  for 
ωω
jj ≥ .  At  ￿ ,, α 11
jj j j EI
− 49  we have 











u 16  (A15)   
and  ￿ Q
j
1 0 =  since   ￿ Q
j
1  is an allocation for  ￿ ω
j  and  ￿ ω
j  is the critical wealth level.    We have this 
inequality also at  α 11
jj j j EI , ￿ , − 49  or  α 11
jj j j EI ,, ￿ − 49 .   Since  ~ Q
j
1 0 ≥  in (A14) we have  ~ ~ CI
jj j ≤ω  and 
~ ~ eI k
j
k
jj ≤ β ω  for k = 12 , .  At  ￿ ,, α 11
jj j j EI
− 49  and  ￿ ω
j , we have   ￿ ￿ ~ CI I C
jj jj j j =>≥ ωω  and  







j =>≥ β ω β ω .   Hence,   ￿ EE k
j
k
j >  for  k = 12 ,  since  ￿ ￿ αα 11 1 11 1
jj j j jj j j eE eE +> +
−−  and 
αα 22 2 22 2
jj j j jj j j eE eE ￿ +> +
−− .   At  α 11
jj j j EI , ￿ , − 49  we have the same result since 







j =>≥ β ω β ω  for k = 12 ,  and αα 11 1 11 1
jj j j jj j j eE eE ￿ ￿ +> +
−− .  At   α 11
jj j j EI ,, ￿ − 49   we also 







j => ≥ β ω β ω  for k = 12 , .  Hence in all three cases  ￿ CC
jj >  
and  ￿ EE k
j
k
j >  for k = 12 , .  Let cC I

















j ￿ , ￿ , ω38  for k = 12 ,  and 
it follows that: 




























cE 16 49 4916 49 49 ￿ , ￿ ￿ , ￿ ,,  
which is also true when α 1
jj  is replaced with  ￿ α 1
jj .   This is a contradiction of (A15).  Hence 
￿ ωω
jj < .  This concludes the proof.   
 ￿￿
 
Appendix  B: Data 
 
Total emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides came from several sources.
1  For 
European countries the data was taken from EMEP, as published in Barrett et. al. (1995),  
Europe’s cooperative program for monitoring transboundary pollution.  These data are also found 
in the OECD 1993 and 1995 Environmental Data Compendiums, which also include data for the 
United States, Canada, and Japan.   The longest series for an individual country that is available 
from these data is 1970, 1975 and 1980-1993.  For some countries there are gaps in the series.  
While this would not normally present a problem for analysis, the formulation of the econometric 
model requires that we have estimates of emissions for all neighboring countries which have 
positive weights in the pollution transport matrix.  Pollution estimates were computed by the 
methodology presented in Kato and Akimoto (1992).  The procedure depends on the 
International Energy Agencies Energy Statistics (IEA)
2, emissions factors for various fuel types 
that are specific to countries and economic activities.  The procedure also depends on abatement 
factors for various sectors and fuel types.  For European countries emission factors were taken 
from Amann (1990), which have been used in the International Institute of Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) model of acidification or RAINS.  Emissions were then estimated for the 
missing years and for adjacent years, at first without adjusting for abatement.  An abatement 
factor was imputed for the adjacent years and then a simple interpolation procedure produced the 
1 For some countries not all years were available. ￿￿
abatement factor for the missing years.  The abatement factor was then applied to unadjusted 
emissions estimates.   
The data for Asian countries was taken from Kato and Akimoto (1992), which is also 
published in UNEP 1993/94.  While the paper only provides estimates for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1986 
and 1987 the procedure outlined is applicable to the data from 1970 to 1993.  Hence, the 
procedure outlined in Kato and Akimoto (1992) was applied to Asian countries 1970, 1981-1984 
and 1998-1993.  The data take into account changes in fuel types toward lower sulfur content in 
Taiwan and Korea.  The trends in these factors were maintained for 1988-1993
3.    The data also 
include emissions from non-ferrous metal industries.  The emissions factors provided in Kato and 
Akimoto (1992) were based on extensive field surveys by the authors and the Research Group on 
the Energy Consumption in Asia and the Global Environment.   
The income measure used is the real GDP per capita series from the Penn 5.6 World 
Tables that have been developed by Summers and Heston (1994). These data were specifically 
constructed for cross country comparisons and are in $1985 (US).  However, the series were not 
complete for the years 1970, 1975, 1980-1993.  For countries where the other variables were 
available, the Penn 5.6 world table data was supplemented with data from the World Bank Tables 
1995 by indexing the World Bank GDP in constant 87 US dollars to the Penn 5.6 RGDP data.  
Population data was also taken from the Penn 5.6 World Tables.  Population density was 
calculated by dividing total population by the area of the country adjusted by the percentage of 
2 IEA energy statistics are provided in two series – Energy Statistics of OECD Countries and 
Energy Statistics of non-OECD countries.  The IEA also publishes these data in electronic format. 
3 This was based on a personal communication with Akimoto (1997). 
 ￿￿
the area of the country that exhibits low human disturbance – a variable obtained from the World 
Resources Institute’s World Resources Data Tables.  
The source of the own deposition factors (α
jj ) and the spillover transport matrix for 
European countries was EMEP.  Barrett et. al. (1995) gives transport matrices for both sulfur and 
oxidized nitrogen for the years 1980, 1985-1993.  Average transport coefficients were used for 
the missing years.  For Canada and the United States “own deposition” and transport factors were 
obtained from Venkatram et. al. (1991)
4.   Transport matrices for Asian Countries are not 
available.  To solve this problem own deposition factors and transport coefficients for Asian 
countries were independently estimated.  Estimates for own country deposition were constructed 
by building a relationship between own country deposition factors and variables easily obtainable 
from other sources for the European and North American countries.  These variables included 
country size, border length, length of coastline, and maritime area. An equation was estimated and 
then applied to the Asian countries.  Estimates for emissions transport  were built in a similar 
manner from the European and North American transport matrices, by building a relationship 
between the portion of a countries’ emissions deposited in another country and other easily 
obtainable variables.  These variables were the shortest distance between the two countries, size 
of each country, length of the border between the two countries, the perimeters of the two 
countries, and downwind dummy variables.   
 
4 In NAPAP Report 8, Section 4 in Acidic Deposition: State of Science and Technology (1991). 
 